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ABSTRACT
Lessons from safety-critical sociotechnical systems, such as aviation and acute medical care, demon-
strate the importance of the human factor and highlight the crucial role of efficient communication
between human agents. Although a large proportion of fatal incidents in aviation have been linked to
failures in communication, cognitive engineering provides the theoretical framework to mitigate risks
and increase performance in sociotechnical systems not only in the civil sector, but also in the military
domain. Conducting cyber operations in multidomain battles presents new challenges for military
training and education as the increased importance of psychological factors such as metacognitive
skills and perspective-taking both in lower and higher ranking staff, becomes more apparent. The
Hybrid Space framework (Jøsok et al., 2016) provides a blueprint for describing the cognitive and
behavioral constraints for maneuvering between socio-technical and cyber-physical systems whilst
cooperating, coordinating or competing with accompanying cognitive styles in the chain of com-
mand. We apply the Hybrid Space framework to communicative challenges in the military cyber
domain and suggest a three-phase Orienting, Locating, Bridging model for safe and efficient com-
munication between partners. Based on the educational principles of the Norwegian Defence Cyber
Academy, we discuss the required skill-sets and knowledge in which cyber officer cadets are trained
and taught early in their education, and how these refer to the theoretical framework of the Hybrid
Space and the key principles of communication as defined in cognitive engineering.
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What is the public significance of this article?—The
orientating, locating and bridging (OLB) model is a
science-based contribution that aims to prevent com-
munication failures arising from individual differences
driven by factors such as hierarchy, bias or effort. A
pedagogic approach to OLB in cyber education can
potentially reduce the cognitive load and ease commu-
nication challenges in complex and critical cyberspace
operations. This knowledge can easily be applied to
civilian applications of cyberspace, such as protection
of critical infrastructure, personal privacy protection
and informing educators in how to enhance perfor-
mance and decision-making in the cyber domain.
In this article, we show how we took a cognitive
engineering process and applied it to communication
activities conducted by military personnel operating in
the cyber domain for improved performance.
Communication in sociotechnical systems1 and its
effect on decision-making are a crucial part of modern
society influencing safety, efficiency, and performance.
Extensive research, particularly in critical civil environ-
ments such as medical acute care and aviation, has
improved our understanding of the constraints, risk,
and possibilities associated with poor communication
(e.g., Entin, 2004; Jacobsson, Hargestam, Hultin, &
Brulin, 2012; Mills, Neily, & Dunn, 2008).
Unsurprisingly, research interest on the effect of com-
munication in the resource-intensive and safety-critical
military context is growing rapidly (e.g., Brun et al.,
2003; Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998; Espevik, Johnsen,
& Eid, 2011; Rosen et al., 2008; Letsky, Warner, Fiore,
& Smith, 2008; Trejo, Richard, Van Driel, & McDonald,
2015). Consequences arising from misunderstandings
and ineffective communication range from undetected
suboptimal performance to potentially fatal incidents
with both local and international consequences (see
Rosen, Fiore, Salas, Letsky, & Warner, 2008). The
cyber domain, which consists of interconnected and
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networked systems and actors represents a new and
important domain for studying communication.
Personnel operating in the cyber domain represent a
group of actors facing work that is characterized by a
unique pattern of human–technological interaction
bearing cognitive challenges that span the digital, phy-
sical, and the social domain (Jøsok et al., 2016; Von
Solms & Van Niekerk, 2013; Whitman & Mattord,
2012). Within the military cyber context, success in
the cyber domain requires a new and unique skillset
compared to more traditional domains.
The digital context and informational environment
has increased mental workloads, shifting demands from
physical fitness toward cognitive performance that is
novel to military domains. This underlines the impor-
tance of versatile preparation of personnel, concepts that
go beyond classical military abilities or technological
skills, and towards more comprehensive qualifications.
The increased awareness of the multiple social (e.g.,
cooperation and communication skills) and cognitive
demands on cyber officers have been widely acknowl-
edged but are not yet reflected in corresponding empirical
research or commonly agreed standards of science-based
education and training. The British Ministry of Defence
recognized the need for skill development beyond tech-
nological domains when it stated that, “The operational
commander in 2035 will need to be as focused on cyber as
on traditional environmental factors” (Ministry of
Defence, 2015). Whereas the US Military Academy at
West Point addressed instructor competencies and
responsibilities by stating that they have “updated their
curriculum and pedagogy so that it now accounts for a
cadet’s level of self-development” (Putz & Raynor in
Reams, 2005). It is also becoming apparent that educa-
tional methods need to correspond to future communica-
tion demands placed upon personnel working in all
military domains—including those conducting cyber
operations.2 To achieve a change in praxis, officer cadet
educational programs should include development of
cognitive characteristics such as, “agility, adaptability,
and creative and critical thinking” (Tikk-Ringas,
Kerttunen, & Spirito, 2014, p. 58). Military cadets who
assume more traditional military training practices with
clearly defined concepts, templates, and order-based
execution may well struggle to fully cope in such an
operating environment (Freedberg, 2016; Tikk-Ringas
et al., 2014). Future operating environments will require
soldiers to communicate effectively with multiple agents
and entities in the cyber domain.
To meet some of the challenges that the cyber
domain poses, as mentioned above, this article suggests
a model for teaching prerequisites for improved com-
munication in the cyber domain. The learning model
will support practitioners operating in safety-critical
environments by reducing the risk of negative conse-
quences resulting from miscommunication. By imple-
menting measures of cognitive engineering designed to
improve communication efficiency in sociotechnical
systems, the aim is to mitigate miscommunications
that may go undetected or underestimated.
We begin this article by reviewing the current
research and practice, detailing the theoretical frame-
works established in cognitive engineering research, as
well as introducing the Hybrid Space conceptual frame-
work. Then, we propose a three-phase Orienting,
Locating, Bridging (OLB) model for teaching and train-
ing to improve outcomes via efficient communication.
The Norwegian Defense Cyber Academy (NDCA) is
used to exemplify the OLB model’s application in a
military educational context. Further, we discuss addi-
tional applications of the OLB before the article con-
cludes and presents ongoing and future work.
Current research and practice
A novel area of research arising from the formal recog-
nition of cyberspace as a military domain of operations
(NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of
Excellence, 2016) is how cognitive engineering can
improve communicative challenges in sociotechnical
systems. The cyber domain creates a special challenge
for efficient communication among military command
structures as the digital and the physical domains con-
verge (Tikk-Ringas et al., 2014; Trujillo, 2014). Higher-
ranking officers hold the final responsibility for the
decisions made. Their routines, command and control
activities, and eventual decision-making are most likely
rooted in and influenced by their previous experience.
However, their situational awareness and decision-
making are heavily influenced, if not determined, by
the perception, interpretation, and evaluation of a given
critical situation by a lower ranking, and often younger
officer who comfortably maneuvers in the cyber
domain (Røislien, 2015). To promote effective commu-
nication, particularly in the cyber domain, there is a
mutual need for perspective-taking skills to understand
others’ need for information, their mental workload,
and a metacognitive awareness concerning one’s own
momentary cognitive states and susceptibilities.
Common ground theory provides the theoretical fra-
mework for understanding the elements of successful
social interaction. It is based on cognitive engineering
and provides a framework to systematically approach
and consequently mitigate risk factors and enhance
efficiency and performance in goal-directed communi-
cation (Clark, 1996; Monk, 2009; Morrow & Fischer,
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2013). Common ground theory stresses the necessity of
a mutual understanding, with which both sender and
receiver consider the exchanged information as accu-
rate, understood, and related to the shared goal (Searle,
1969). As a result of grounded communication, both
partners are able to co-construct a shared mental model
that can support “shared consciousness” and “empow-
ered execution” (McChrystal, Collins, Fussell, &
Silverman, 2015).
The aspects described above capture the challenge of
developing shared mental models in the military domain,
where hierarchy and rank structures can impact perspec-
tive taking. In particular the emerging nature of the cyber
domain adds layers of complexity that further exasperate
the challenge of achieving common ground. Approaches
capable of finding common ground in the cyber domain
need to be considered in the context of networked intelli-
gence (McChrystal et al., 2015; Tapscott, 2014) andmulti-
domain battles (Tan, 2016) as these approaches are
heavily dependent upon shared situational awareness for
sense-making. For example, multidomain challenges
influence communication in military domains by mer-
ging the need to empower lower ranks through models of
command and control that are context-oriented, rather
than reverting them to the norm of restrictive hierarchical
communication systems. Communication can be more
effective if the actors (i.e., the individuals communicating
with one another) can more closely align their mental
models in dynamic hybrid operating environments. This
will rely upon methods of education and training that
aspire to higher levels of consciousness (Joiner & Josephs,
2006; Kegan & Lahey, 2009) in both junior and senior
military personnel, as they are expected to undertake
mutually beneficial actions of self-orienting and locating
each other, to bridge grounded communication.
Because of these new demands, higher-ranking com-
manders will be required to accept new communication
concepts and training for agile maneuvering in the cyber
domain. Commanders need to be able to strategically
empower lower-ranking soldiers, reduce strict divisions
between tactical and strategic personnel, and act to facil-
itate effective communication that allows for goal-directed
and accurate use of information as well as an increased
level of openness among involved personnel. The OLB
model presented in this article dissects the steps required
for successful communication in the Hybrid Space (Jøsok
et al., 2016) and provides guidance for both lower and
higher ranks to promote grounded communication.
The Hybrid Space framework
A recent theoretical proposal addressed many of the
challenges described above by introducing the Hybrid
Space conceptual framework (Jøsok et al., 2016)
(see Figure 1). The framework represents an indivi-
dual’s range of cognition when involved in tasks that
span strategic vs. tactical, or physical (kinetic) vs. cyber
operations. Along the spectrum of these dimensions,
different cognitive skills are necessary/used, for exam-
ple, heuristics, social-cognitive perspective-taking, spa-
tial cognition for kinetic, self-regulation for planning,
evaluating, and monitoring one’s own processes and
macrocognition for team performance. The framework
acknowledges the new structures and demands by
articulating the needs for cognitive flexibility and per-
spective-taking on an inter- and intra-individual level,
which allows for the application of psychological con-
cepts in assessment, in training and action of military
cyber personnel. The Hybrid Space not only describes
how the individual cognitively maneuvers between
dynamic tactical/strategic and cyber-physical/sociotech-
nical demands, but it also implies the need for objective
orientation related to one’s own and other communica-
tion partner’s momentary mental ‘location’ within these
domains. It also reveals the requirements for effective
communication bridging to ensure optimal perfor-
mance levels. This perspective taking is required to
co-construct a shared mental model with communica-
tion partners.
In the military context of the cyber domain, the
construction of shared mental models leads to mutual
understanding and efficient processing of time-critical
information, provides the basis for tactical decisions
with potentially large strategic implications, and thus
requires the reduction of risk factors that lead to mis-
communication. Using the two-dimensional structure
of the Hybrid Space rather than adapting or copying
Figure 1. The hybrid space. Reprinted from exploring the
hybrid space - theoretical framework applying cognitive science
in military cyberspace operations (pp. 181). Ø. Jøsok, B.J. Knox,
K. Helkala, R.G. Lugo, S. Sütterlin, & P. Ward. 2016, Foundations
of Augmented Cognition: Neuroergonomics and Operational
Neuroscience LNCS Volume 9744.
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existing models allows for more straightforward pre-
sentation of the unique characteristics of the human
factor in military cyber operations typical in today’s
multi-domain battles.
The OLB model: How to educate for grounding of
communication in the cyber domain
When co-constructing a shared mental model, commu-
nication partners should apply techniques to enhance
situational awareness, information-processing resources
such as working memory, cognitive flexibility, metacog-
nitive awareness, and perspective-taking (Morrow &
Fischer, 2013). The Hybrid Space framework
(Figure 1) allows for the introduction of applied cogni-
tive science into cyber domain education. The OLB
model is based on this framework and dissects maneu-
vering within the Hybrid Space into three core phases
(see Figure 2). The educational implications are illu-
strated in Figure 3.
Phase 1: Orienting—momentary metacognitive aware-
ness of one’s cognitive location in the Hybrid Space.
Phase 2: Locating—accurately judge the communication
partners’ cognitive location in the Hybrid Space.
Phase 3: Bridging—adapting content and style to ensure
grounding for appropriate communication to construct a
shared mental model of the current situation.
Orienting
A prerequisite for an accurate placement of one’s own
cognitive location within the Hybrid Space (orienting)
is the metacognitive awareness of factors influencing
one’s momentary mental state and ongoing cognitive
processes. In Hybrid Space terms, this refers to the
ability to monitor and regulate thinking along the
cyber-physical and strategic-tactical dimensions (hori-
zontal and vertical axis, Figure 2a). An example of
orienting could be a junior cyber operator preparing
to brief or communicate the recognized cyber picture
(RCP) to a senior but nontechnical person. If a network
intrusion has occurred, a RCP brief should accurately
present the severity and potential known or unknown
consequences. Good metacognitive awareness allows
the operator to visualize the most appropriate mode,
method, and content of communication to ensure he/
she relays an accurate message that is not only received
correctly but also understood. Similarly, a nontechnical
commander will need to regulate and monitor his/her
own thinking, behavior and be open to extending his/
her cognition and modes of communication. This will
allow for better understanding and appreciation of cri-
tical and quite possibly incomplete information being
presented by a junior expert. As the examples above
show, failure to orientate prior to receiving an RCP
brief could result in a critical communication error
occurring. Attempting to orientate to gain mutual
understanding or a shared mental model is challenged
further when the RCP brief takes place across multiple
and heterogeneous communication partners in the
(a) Orienting (b) Locating (c)Bridging
Figure 2. OLB model as a procedure to communicate across the Hybrid Space. (S-strategic, T-tactical, P-physical, C-cyber). (a)
Orienting. (b) Locating. (c) Bridging.
Figure 3. Pedagogic path for OLB – a practice to reduce the cognitive cost of communication in the hybrid space.
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Hybrid Space—some face-to-face and others via digital
means. This is because the communicator has to be
keenly aware of more than one location in the Hybrid
Space and be cognizant of the implications for commu-
nicating within these different spaces.
Locating
Once an individual has gained metacognitive awareness
of his/her location within the Hybrid Space, locating
the communication partner constitutes Phase 2 in the
OLB model (Figure 2b). Locating specifically involves
accurately judging a communication partner’s cognitive
location in the Hybrid Space. It also involves identify-
ing factors that can impact a partner’s interpretation of
incoming information. For instance, understanding a
partner’s knowledge, skills, and emotional state and
current cognitive load, as well as cultural background
and contextual circumstances (time pressure, external
expectation, conflicting task priorities), can help an
individual tailor a message to meet their partner’s
immediate needs and ensure proper understanding.
The act of perspective taking is an important process in
the locating phase of the OLB model. Factors such as a
partner’s expertise, experience with a particular topic, and
professional conventionsmay impact how he or she thinks,
talks, and interprets information and can thus be used to
establish communal command ground (Monk, 2009). For
example, rethinking hierarchical systems to empower
lower ranking personnel (Tan, 2016) and thus increase
their contextual knowledge could positively affect the
lower ranking person’s capacity to contribute to effective
grounding. Understanding what communities a person
belongs to may allow agents to make certain assumptions
about existing common ground. They can then use this
knowledge to make communication across the hybrid
space more effective. In a borderless domain, mediated by
electronic communication, this perspective takingmight be
more relevant than in face-to-face situations where cultural
misunderstandings are more easily detected by the use of
multiple communication modalities.
Personal common ground gained prior to or during
a communication improves the location process
further. The personal state of mind such as the level
of acute or chronic stress and momentary attentional
focus directly influence the quality of grounding and
can change at an instant. Individuals who feel observed,
monitored, and socially challenged in a conversation
within a hierarchical system are more likely to engage
in self-monitoring behavior at the cost of their cogni-
tive task performance and ongoing problem-solving or
communicative demands. For example, communication
failure can occur in a hierarchical system where defen-
sive reasoning flourishes (Argyris, 1991).
Without perspective taking and acknowledging com-
munication partners needs, a junior expert attempting to
present the RCP to a nontechnical commander could
negatively affect communication flow by incorrect locat-
ing and message framing. In this context, interaction may
also suffer at the cost of performance outcomes on an
individual and team level if the commander is unwilling
to locate—through acknowledging the junior experts’
needs and requirements—and engage in learning and
knowledge creation, to gain critical understanding. The
complexity of locating escalates when a RCP has to be
delivered via digital communication means to multiple
heterogeneous recipients across the Hybrid Space.
Bridging
The final phase, bridging, describes the adaptation of
content and style of grounded communication to
coconstruct a shared situational model (Figure 2c).
When the process of orienting (requiring metacogni-
tion) and locating (requiring perspective-taking) has
given insight in the relative location of the communica-
tion partners, bridging the remaining gap requires an
adaptation of the form and content of information
provided. This includes a common understanding of
the appropriate level of detail, the conventional norms
and forms of presentation, knowledge about the degree
of tolerated uncertainty, the situationally appropriate
level of confidence into one’s own judgment or self-
criticism, and the openness to admit the need for addi-
tional information or simplification. By adapting com-
municated content and its style in a way that maximizes
the overlap of shared cognitive representations, the
cognitive distance between two partners within the
Hybrid Space is reduced and the risk of misunderstand-
ings and misinterpretations limited. Successful bridging
acknowledges the partners’ cognitive position along the
tactical-strategic and the cyber-physical domain.
Preparing the appropriate amount and type of informa-
tion in a way that acknowledges a partners’ cognitive
position is key to successful communication in critical
situations. For example, bridging for successful com-
munication of a RCP has to be adaptive and able to
engage in immediate self-correcting actions in face-to-
face communication. In a multidomain context, brid-
ging for good communication of a RCP may require
opening multiple lines of communication for adjusted
framing of communication. Communicating with more
heterogeneous multiple recipients is challenging, as
information demands and understandings vary. For
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this reason, the OLB points out the need for training
and development of communication skills to enhance
communicating messages simultaneously in face-to-
face dyadic mode and in a socio-technical context.
The NDCA approach
The three phases of the OLB model constitute ele-
ments fostering grounded communication in a mili-
tary cyber domain setting. The NDCA emphasizes in
their training of cyber officer cadets applied cognitive
science and various sub-areas of psychology as a cen-
tral element of their education program. To facilitate
metacognitive awareness for orienting, the NDCA
covers topics such as personality psychology, psycho-
physiological interaction to sensory perception, effects
of acute and chronic stress on cognitive performance,
group effects on decision-making, and macrocogni-
tion. These are combined with practical experience
involving regular peer-group and mentor feedback
provided in written and oral form. According to the
OLB model, forming a realistic perspective of oneself
in a complex sociotechnical system is a crucial pre-
requisite for successfully locating oneself within the
Hybrid Space and fostering safe and efficient commu-
nication. The NDCA applies the OLB model and aims
to enhance individual skills to orientate within the
Hybrid Space by the use of reflection logs and fre-
quent feedback. Using reflection and reflective dialo-
gues as a tool to build an evidence base for new
perspectives, where a cadet moves from being a
detached observer to an involved learner (Brigden &
Purcell, 2004), supports the orientation function by
enhancing metacognitive awareness. Becoming more
aware of yourself through metacognitive training a
hybrid-operating environment can provide the neces-
sary scaffolding for success in Phase 2: locating.
Achieving a high level of mutual perspective taking
and awareness for communication partners’ situational
demands in dynamic contexts are central elements of
teaching and training at the NDCA. This content is
meant to train cadets on the locating phase of the
OLB model. A curriculum including subject areas
such as intercultural knowledge and international
operations acknowledges this need in cyber cadet
cohorts. At the NDCA, cadets get exposed to a curri-
culum equipping them with the knowledge and cultural
understanding to mediate their communication efforts
in the borderless cyber domain.
In their final year at the NDCA, cadets practice
bridging skills by planning activities in complex and
varying context, ranging from classroom environments
to demanding military exercises. The cadets are
expected to lead people—their own cohort and junior
cadets—and processes. Teachers and instructors act as
facilitators as well as a heterogeneous group of actors
within the sociotechnical system. The intent is to
encourage cadets to train their skills in adapting the
form and content of information being communicated
in order to ensure effective bridging. Figure 3 shows
how the NDCA applies the model in teaching
curriculum.
Furthering understanding and applications of OLB
Other constraints for successful (i.e., efficient and safe)
communication—of particular relevance in a military
structure—are culture, social norms, conventions, and
formal constraints caused by the authority gradient
based on formal ranking. These constraints based on
an asymmetry of power and agency are commonly
associated with the use of indirect speech of a lower
ranking person toward someone of higher status, and
the tendency to avoid expressions or formulations that
could be perceived as critical, disagreeing, impolite, or
not sufficiently appreciative (Blum-Kulka, House, &
Kasper, 1989; Grice, 1975; Jason, Keys, Suarez-
Balcazar, Taylor, & Davis, 2004; Xiao, Seagull,
Mackenzie, Ziegert, & Klein, 2003). Conversely, these
constraints occur when higher ranking officers incor-
rectly (consciously or unconsciously) make assump-
tions about junior officers’ level of competence in a
particular domain where the junior officer has exper-
tise. This could lead to communication failures (i.e.,
indirect communication, partial communication or
even body language) and result in misinterpretation at
the receiving end, having a negative effect for develop-
ing shared mental models (DeChurch & Mesmer-
Magnus, 2010). Developing (or the emergence of) a
shared situational awareness or shared mental model
around partially overlapping expertise (probable con-
sequences of action) and responsibilities (tactical and
strategic considerations) will be difficult because of the
clear role distinctions based on seniority and rank. In
this case, higher ranking officers are potentially una-
ware of factors influencing a young cyber officer’s judg-
ment, performance, and goals (Sexton, Thomas, &
Helmreich, 2001) thus leading to poor situational
awareness and lack of shared mental models.
Misinterpretations of critical situations in aviation
based on this type of communication failure between
pilot and first officer have been termed “monitoring/
challenging error” by the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB, 1994 in Fischer &
Orasanu, 2000). This error was found to occur in over
75% of the air traffic accidents reviewed (Morrow &
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Fischer, 2013). This type of error has also been
acknowledged in acute medical care, where the com-
munication within a surgical team is similarly chal-
lenged by differences in social status between nurses
and doctors, and a lack of understanding of the external
factors influencing the partners’ cognitive abilities
(Korb, Geißler, & Strauß, 2015).
Explicit procedures such as reading back informa-
tion to ensure mutual understanding are supposed to
facilitate grounding in both aviation and medical care.
To avoid misunderstandings caused by the authority
gradient and related conventions, research in aviation
found positive effects where communication skills
allowed for a good balance of informativeness and
social appropriateness (Fischer & Orasanu, 2000),
and where crew members stated explicitly how the
perceived information was interpreted and how they
are about to react on it. Although the speaker (e.g.,
the cyber officer) has to make sure that the intention
of his presented information is mutually understood,
it is the receiving person’s responsibility to signalize
his or her level of understanding. A communication
style based on mutual reassurance, openness to correc-
tion, re-evaluation, negotiation, and adjustment is also
needed in the military to minimize barriers to colla-
boration and communication bottlenecks and to facil-
itate effective grounding (McChrystal et al., 2015).
OLB for grounded communication
Grounded communication in the context of cyber
operations faces particular challenges that result
directly from the location of the individual’s cognitive
focus across the axes of the Hybrid Space (Figure 1),
and the cognitive costs of constant movement along
them, leading to depletion of attentional resources
(Jøsok et al., 2016). An example of the cognitive impli-
cations and changes in decision-making processes
when being continuously exposed to the cyber domain,
arises from the physical, and consequently, emotional
distance to this environment that is directly affected via
digital means. The decision maker, empowered by the
cyber domain, is less directly confronted with the out-
comes of the decision. The anticipation of future
action’s outcomes is more abstract, less detailed, and
typically decision-making processes are under time
pressure. These circumstances in the decision-
making processes in the cyber domain, together with
other assumed, but not yet investigated aspects, such as
an increased tolerance to uncertainty, increases the
cognitive load on decision stakeholders. To ensure
grounded communication, the cyber officer has to be
aware of the strategic considerations affecting the situa-
tional assessment, awareness, and decision-making pro-
cess of higher ranking officers to whom he or she
reporting (e.g., Krulak, 1999; Lemay, Leblanc, & Jesus,
2015; Liddy, 2004; Stringer, 2009). At the same time,
his/her own decisions in the cyber domain relating to
cyber operations may affect the strategic goals of the
mission. The possibility of strategic impact, the impli-
cations and the resulting options concerning how to
react to these impacts, needs to be communicated
accordingly.
OLB for better regulatory behavior
Monitoring and adjusting one’s own cognitive location
within the Hybrid Space increases cognitive demands
considerably. In a time-critical situation, a relatively
young/junior cyber operator with appropriate domain
understanding and enough knowledge to allow for
strategic consideration may lack the skill-set for
grounded communication. In this instance, not being
“heard” by a higher ranking commander prone to
biased judgments can affect the strategic goal due to
his/her distant relative location on the Hybrid Space’s
axes (Jøsok et al., 2016). In this example, communica-
tion failure results from insufficient grounding. The
former lacked training in OLB processes—not necessa-
rily mental capacity—whilst the latter lacked cognitive
regulatory resources and reverted to the hierarchy
norm to avoid further increasing the cognitive load.
OLB for grounded communication in multi-domain
environments
In the context of multidomain battles, grounded com-
munication becomes essential for team and task maneu-
vering (i.e., cross-domain cyber operations). Historical
and contemporary military norms and practices of com-
munication will not suffice (General D. Perkins in Tan,
2016). Changes in education and training will be neces-
sary to meet the potential consequences of the changing
and diverse nature of the battlefield. The increased inter-
connectivity, reliance, and conjunction of multiple
domains translate to heightened operational complexity,
and affects leaders, decision makers, operators, and sol-
diers on the ground (Ministry of Defence, 2015). The
extent and complexity of tasks will likely require
domain-specific expertise working in collaboration
with expertise from other conflicting or complementary
domains, in a form of “multidomain problem solving.”
As earlier research in teams and collaboration shows, it
is not enough to put people with a particular expertise or
the “right” knowledge together in a group and expect
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them to work seamlessly (Hackman, 1990; Mathieu,
Tannenbaum, Donsbach, & Alliger, 2014). This phe-
nomenon occurs as teams of experts are often hierarchi-
cally structured (Brun et al., 2003) and their approach to
mastering the complexity of the given environment is to
divide the given task into manageable pieces and dele-
gate it to the expert team members (Brun et al., 2003).
Brun and colleagues (2003) further pointed to the fact
that hierarchical structures may have a negative influ-
ence on team communication. In hierarchical teams,
performance suffers as the level of communication
rises through the chain-of-command (Cannon-Bowers,
Salas, & Converse, 1993), and communication is char-
acterized by questions and answers. This is contrary to
flat structured teams where peer relationship behavior is
directed into finding and offering information based on
one’s own initiative (Urban, Bowers, Monday, &
Morgan Jr., 1995) leading to better communication and
performance.
OLB for improved cross cultural team communication
The momentary need for grounded communication is
explored in time-framed tasks, often with routine
actions and stable competence demands (i.e., a flight
plan from A to B; Morrow & Fischer, 2013). This
leads to the use of artifact tools, such as checklists or
as in read-back strategies to ensure grounded commu-
nication. Although relevant, some conclusions have
relied heavily on results from US research on US
personnel (Brun et al., 2003). This reliance leads to
research implications when a similar task includes
cultural aspects or cross-cultural collaboration in a
complex multidomain sociotechnical cyber-physical
system, where teams operate with overlapping sche-
dules and responsibility gets transferred (Morrow &
Fischer, 2013). Training metacognitive skills to sup-
port improved orientation in cross cultural multido-
main operating environments could give an advantage
to military personnel as they attempt to locate com-
munication partners. The cyber domain is creating
novel communication challenges compared to direct
face-to-face communications framed by physical pre-
sence. Digital communication and time-lagged inter-
action poses particular challenges for the
communicators both on the sending and the receiving
end. Awareness about these sensitivities is therefore
increasingly relevant as more digital, indirect, and
asynchronous the communication becomes.
Conclusion
In an era of cyber operations and multi-domain battles,
new challenges are presented for military training and
education. Cognitive engineering can provide theoreti-
cal models to understand the conditions of safe and
effective communication and design interventions to
increase communication skills, which have been
shown to be one of the most frequent sources of
human failure or under-performance in safety-critical
sociotechnical systems both in the civil as well as mili-
tary domains. As a consequence, teaching and training
in the military cyber domain needs to acknowledge the
need for knowledge building in psychological functions
as represented in enhanced metacognitive skills and
mutual perspective-taking.
By applying theHybrid Space theoretical framework, we
locate communication partners within a cognitive space
determined by tactical/strategic and cyber-physical/socio-
technical dimensions. The proposed three-phase OLB
model describes the consecutive and complementary
steps that lead to a better grounding of communication in
a field of overlapping expertise and separated responsibil-
ities along the authority gradient typical for military
context.
In an attempt to meet today’s challenges and as a
means of taking justified science-based steps toward
future teaching doctrines in cyber education, the
NDCA aims to enhance future cyber operators’ com-
munication skills by training and teaching the afore-
mentioned skills from early stages in their education.
Future work
What remains to be studied is if it is enough to rely on
momentary grounding measures or whether teams,
working in complex hybrid environments should expend
greater effort grounding communication ahead of opera-
tions. The NDCA are conducting empirical studies aimed
at applying the OLB model in various contexts relevant
for military cyber operations and in non-military con-
texts. This includes communicative challenges on the
team level, monitoring communicative processes in real
time—the role of cognitive agility for grounded commu-
nication and performance assessment—and the influence
of personality characteristics and the changing role of
leadership in a cyberspace context.
Notes
1. Sociotechnical system is the interaction of people and
technology, composed of social, management and tech-
nical subsystems (Troxler & Lauche, 2015).
2. Cyber operations is defined as the employment of
cyber capabilities with the primary purpose of achiev-
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